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COURT-ORDERED COLLEGE:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND EFFECTS OF
POST-MAJORITY SUPPORT
INTRODUCTION
In today’s society, two things are certain: divorce is common and
college is expensive. It should be no surprise that when a child from a
family of divorce goes to college, the question of who will pay for his
or her education is likely to arise. Though child support typically ter-
minates when a child reaches the age of adulthood, many states have
enacted statutes that might force a parent to contribute to a child’s
educational expenses throughout college. Illinois is one of those
states. Section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act (IMDMA) titled “Educational Expenses for a Non-Minor
Child” allows a court, on a case-by-case basis, to mandate one or both
unmarried parents to contribute to the post-majority1 educational ex-
penses of their child.2 Since its enactment, the statute’s constitutional-
ity has been challenged twice as a violation of equal protection.3
Opponents argue that the statute unfairly discriminates against un-
married parents by forcing them to pay for their child’s education,
while it does not impose the same requirements on married parents.
This Comment examines § 513 of the IMDMA and the constitution-
ality, as well as the implications, of the statute. It compares what
courts in other states have done with similar statutes as well as the
rulings of prior claims in Illinois. Further, this Comment discusses real
world scenarios of how the statute applies to various familial situa-
tions. This Comment also proposes recommendations on how to
amend the statute to address some of its practical downfalls.
Part I describes the statute and its background. This Part further
analyzes the relevant cases in Illinois that have previously challenged
the statute, as well as cases in other states that have challenged similar
post-majority educational laws. Part II analyzes the likelihood of
1. “Post-majority expenses” are expenses for a child who has achieved the age of majority. In
Illinois, the age of majority is 18. Munck v. Munck, 378 N.E.2d 1252, 1255 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). If
the child is still in high school when he turns eighteen, he will reach the age of majority when he
either graduates high school or turns nineteen, whichever comes first. Jody Meyer Yazici et al.,
The Illinois Practice of Family Law, in 12 ILLINOIS PRACTICE SERIES 419 (17th ed. 2018).
2. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513 (West 2019).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
171
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whether a constitutional claim would succeed. Part II also discusses
how the statute may apply unfairly to different family structures and
addresses some grievances against the statute. Part III proposes legis-
lative changes to § 513 in the event that the statute is upheld as
constitutional.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part explains the background and the purpose of § 513 of the
IMDMA. This Part also provides the language of the statute and de-
scribes its application. Next, this Part discusses the framework of an
equal protection claim and reviews how previous courts in other states
have ruled on constitutional challenges to similar statutes. Finally, this
Part illustrates how Illinois courts have ruled on equal protection
claims related to § 513.
A. Section 513: Educational Expenses for a Non-Minor Child
The IMDMA was enacted in 1977 after Illinois adopted a modified
version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA).4 Among
the wave of newly introduced statutes was § 513 of the IMDMA,
which makes it possible for a court to order divorced parents to con-
tribute to college education expenses for their post-majority aged chil-
dren.5 Prior to this change, a parents’ child support obligations would
have expired upon the child reaching age eighteen. After the change,
they now can be liable for further expenses beyond the age of
majority.
Section 513 states that a court may award sums of money from ei-
ther or both parents for the educational expenses of any child of the
parties.6 Under the statute, a child’s post-secondary expenses include:
tuition and fees, housing expenses, medical expenses and insurance,
and living expenses such as food, utilities, and transportation.7 The
amount of tuition and fees is capped at the amount of in-state tuition
paid at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.8 Furthermore,
4. Sarah Frances King, Till Death Do Us Part or Otherwise Approved by the Court? Interpret-
ing the Language of § 510(C) of the IMDMA Regarding Post-Death Maintenance Obligations
and Life Insurance, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 713, 717 (2011).
5. The statute allows for contribution to “college education or vocational or professional or
other training,” unless agreed otherwise by the parties. Yazici et al., supra note 1, at 421.
6. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(a) (West 2019).
7. Id. 5/513(d)(1)–(4).
8. Id. 5/513(d)(1). Though the amount is capped at the cost of the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, this still exposes many parents to the risk of an extremely large financial
obligation. The University of Illinois is the most expensive public university in the state of Illi-
nois and was ranked as one of the most expensive public universities in the country in 2014.
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the statute provides for payment of expenses incurred during school
breaks.9 For example, if the child is away from school and is living in
the home of Parent A, Parent B may be ordered to contribute to ex-
penses incurred by Parent A or by the child.10
Under § 513, not every non-married parent is mandated to contrib-
ute to their child’s college expenses.11 Instead, the court will consider
a variety of factors in order to determine whether or not to order one
or both parents to contribute.12 These factors include:
(1) The present and future financial resources of both parents, in-
cluding, but not limited to, savings for retirement;13
(2) The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the
marriage not been dissolved;14
(3) The financial resources of the child;15
(4) The child’s academic performance.16
The court must also consider all further “relevant factors that ap-
pear reasonable and necessary.”17 After consideration of the enumer-
ated factors and all others that the court deems necessary, the court
has the discretion to order one or both parents to contribute payment
either to the student, to the other parent, or to the university or col-
lege directly.18 The parents’ obligation to pay these expenses will ter-
minate when the child reaches the age of twenty-three, obtains his
Allan Smith, The 10 Most Expensive State Schools, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 2, 2014, 2:04 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/most-expensive-public-universities-2014-7. For the 2019-2020
school year, in-state tuition ranges from $16,210-$21,214 per year, room and board costs $11,480,
and supplies and expenses are estimated at a combined $3,700. Undergraduate Admissions: Tui-
tion, U. OF ILL. BD. OF TRUSTEES, https://admissions.illinois.edu/invest/tuition (last visited Aug.
25, 2019). Expenses for student organizations such as fraternities and sororities, and other living
expenses, can drive this number up even higher.




13. Id. 5/513(j)(1). A 2016 amendment to the statute added the language “including, but not
limited to, savings for retirement.” Yazici et al., supra note 1, at 421. In addition, the second
district has held that this factor may include a consideration of a new spouse’s income. In re
Marriage of Drysch, 732 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). Because the statute uses the term
“financial resources” rather than “income,” a new spouse’s income may be considered as part of
a parent’s “financial resources” pursuant to the statute. Id. at 129.
14. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(j)(2) (West 2019).
15. Funds contained in a college savings account that were deposited prior to the dissolution
of marriage are considered to be “resources of the child” for purposes of this factor. Id. 5/
513(j)(3). However, funds deposited after the dissolution are considered to be a contribution
from whichever party contributed to the account. Id. 5/513(h).
16. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(j)(4) (West 2019).
17. Id. 5/513(j).
18. Id. 5/513(e).
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bachelor’s degree, fails to maintain a “C” grade point average, or gets
married.19
Although child support generally expires when the child turns eigh-
teen and reaches adulthood, this statute makes it possible for divorced
parents to continue to be liable for their child’s expenses for up to five
years after the child turns eighteen.20 The purpose of this statute is to
promote the best interests of the child and to enforce obligations on
divorced parents that would have been provided had the marriage
stayed intact.21 When enacting the statute, the legislature sought to
address both the short and long term economic and social impacts of
divorce by providing means to mitigate any potential harm that di-
vorce may cause children.22
B. Equal Protection Claim
Many who oppose § 513 claim that the statute violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United Stated
Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause states that: “No State shall
. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of the law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law.”23 Under the Equal Protection Clause, states
are given wide discretion to create laws that affect groups of people in
different ways.24 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the
court must construe a statute to affirm its constitutionality if reasona-
bly possible.25 However, persons who are similarly situated may not
be unfairly discriminated against unless the government can demon-
strate an appropriate interest for doing so.26 To determine if a statute
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, a court must first determine the
nature of the right that is impacted.27 If the statute disadvantages a
suspect class or infringes upon a fundamental right protected by the
Constitution, the court will analyze the statute under the strict scru-
tiny standard of review.28 Under strict scrutiny, the statute must be
19. Id. 5/513(g).
20. Id.
21. King, supra note 4, at 745.
22. In re Marriage of Thompson, 398 N.E.2d 17, 22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
24. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961).
25. In re D.W., 827 N.W.2d 466, 480 (Ill. 2005).
26. People v. Masterson, 958 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ill. 2011).
27. Id.
28. Id. A suspect class is a group of persons who has been “saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process,” and is therefore deserving of heightened judicial scrutiny. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
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narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.29
However, if the statute does not disadvantage a suspect class or im-
permissibly infringe upon a fundamental right, the court will instead
use a rational basis standard.30 Under this form of review, the statute
will survive a constitutional attack if the court finds that a legitimate
state interest exists and that the statute is rationally related to that
legitimate interest.31 If the statute passes this analysis, the statute will
be upheld as constitutional.32
C. Interpretation in Other States
Many states have similar statutes that were also enacted in the
1970s following the UMDA guidelines.33 After enactment, many par-
ents challenged those statutes as unconstitutional on the grounds of
equal protection, but most courts have refused to strike down such
laws as unconstitutional.34
For example, in Childers v. Childers, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington declined to hold a statute similar to § 513 as unconstitutional
on the basis of equal protection.35 In Childers, a father challenged the
statute, arguing that divorced parents should be able to “legally bid
their children ‘a fiscal farewell’ at age [eighteen]” just as married par-
ents are able to do.36 The court, however, disagreed.37 The court held
that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting children that come
from broken homes and ensuring that their disadvantages are mini-
mized.38 The court noted that the statute does not require all divorced
parents to pay for their child’s education, just those who likely would
have if the marriage stayed intact.39 These children should not be pe-
427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). Classifications based on race and national origin have been treated as
suspect classes under the law of equal protection. Id.




33. Lindsay E. Cohen, Daddy, Will You Buy Me a College Education? Children of Divorce
and the Constitutional Implications of Noncustodial Parents Providing for Higher Education, 66
MO. L. REV. 187, 193–94 (2001).
34. See Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E. 960 (N.D. 1991); In re Marriage of Vrban, 293
N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980); LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350 (N.H. 1993); Curtis v. Kline, 666
A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995); Birchfield v. Birchfield, 417 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1988); Childers v. Childers,
575 P.2d 201, 209 (Wash. 1978).
35. Childers, 575 P.2d at 209.
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nalized for their parents’ decision to divorce.40 The court concluded
that the legislature, when enacting the statute, simply sought to secure
the education for children that they would have received from their
parents but for the divorce.41 Therefore, the statute was deemed con-
stitutional under a rational basis standard.42
Courts in several other states followed Childers and have upheld
post-majority support statutes as constitutional.43 These courts have
generally held that the state has a rational interest in mitigating harm-
ful effects on children from divorced families.44
However, in Curtis v. Kline, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a
law, similar to § 513, unconstitutional.45 The Pennsylvania law re-
quired divorced parents to financially contribute to their child’s col-
lege education.46 In Curtis, a divorced father petitioned to terminate
financial support on the grounds that obligating divorced parents to
provide post-secondary education to adult children violated the Equal
Protection Clause.47 The court held that the father’s equal protection
rights had been violated.48 The court used a rational basis standard to
review the father’s constitutional right.49 The state’s legitimate inter-
est was “requiring some parental financial assistance for a higher edu-
cation for children of parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried
or otherwise subject to an existing support obligation.”50
In Curtis, the court determined that the statute created two classes
of young adults rather than two classes of parents.51 These classes con-
sisted of children with married parents versus children with unmarried
parents.52 The state established a benefit to the class of children with
unmarried parents, by requiring their parents to fund their college ed-
ucation.53 The court held there was “no rational basis for the state
government to provide only certain adult citizens with legal means to
40. Id.
41. Childers, 575 P.2d at 209.
42. Id.
43. See Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962–63 (N.D. 1991); In re Marriage of
Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1980); LeClair v. LeClair, 624 A.2d 1350, 1357 (N.H. 1993);
Birchfield v. Birchfield, 417 N.W.2d 891, 894 (S.D. 1988).
44. See Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d at 962–63; Vrban, 293 N.W.2d at 202; LeClair, 624 A.2d at
1357; Birchfield, 417 N.W.2d at 894.
45. Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. 1995).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 267.
48. Id. at 269–70.
49. Id. at 269.
50. Id.
51. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 270.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 269.
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overcome the difficulties they encounter” in seeking post-secondary
education.54
The court rejected the reasoning of other courts that a rational in-
terest existed to promote the college education of children of di-
vorce.55 It denied that the discrimination was focused on parents, and
instead stated that the issue at hand was “whether similarly situated
young adults. i.e.[,] those in need of financial assistance, may be
treated differently.”56 The court concluded that there is no rational
reason for treating similarly situated young adults differently, and the
statute was therefore deemed unconstitutional.57 The Curtis court an-
alyzed the constitutionality in a distinct manner than those before it
and found that the statute violated children’s rights rather than the
parent’s rights.58
D. Prior Claims in Illinois
Illinois courts have heard challenges to the constitutionality of § 513
twice: first in 1978, just one year after the statute’s enactment, and
more recently in 2018 in a case now pending appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court.
The Illinois Supreme Court first ruled on the constitutionality of
§ 513 in the case of Kujawinski v. Kujawinski.59 In Kujawinski, § 513
was challenged as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause.60 The plaintiff alleged that § 513 “invidiously discriminate[d]
against divorced parents.”61 Moreover, the plaintiff argued that the
statute was unconstitutional because it required divorced parents to
pay for the education of the children beyond the age of majority,
while the same burden was not imposed on non-divorced parents.62
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed.63 The court held that § 513
was rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose and therefore
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.64 The court reasoned that
after a divorce, ex-spouses will go their separate ways, begin new lives,
and amass additional expenses that they would not have accrued had
54. Id. at 269–70.
55. Id. at 270.
56. Id.
57. Curtis, 666 A.2d at 270.
58. Id.
59. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1384–85 (Ill. 1978).
60. Id.
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they stayed together.65 As a result parents may not always be able to
support their children to the same extent that they would have if they
were still married and living with their child.66 The state has a legiti-
mate interest in ensuring that children of divorce will not suffer such
potential harm.67 The court stated:
In a normal household, parents direct their children as to when and
how they should work or study, that is on the assumption of a nor-
mal family relationship, where parental love and moral obligation
dictate what is best for the children. Under such circumstances, nat-
ural pride in the attainments of a child would demand of parents
provision for a college education, even at a sacrifice. When we turn
to divorced parents a disrupted family society cannot count on nor-
mal protection for the child, and it is here that equity takes control
to mitigate the hardship that may befall children of divorced
parents.68
The court reasoned that the legislature enacted this law to mitigate the
economic and personal impact that divorce has on families and chil-
dren, and held that the statute is rationally related to accomplishing
this legislative goal.69 The court explained that if parents could have
been expected to provide an education for their child had they not
divorced, the legislature has an interest in ensuring they do so after
divorce.70 Therefore, the court determined that the statute did not vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause and was constitutionally sound.71
Section 513 was constitutionally challenged again in the 2018 par-
entage case of Yakich v. Aulds, where a DuPage County judge ruled
the statute was unconstitutional.72 Here, the father, who was never
married to the child’s mother, challenged the statute as unconstitu-
tional on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause.73 The father had no
issue with paying the full amount of college tuition for his daughter.74
However, he disagreed with her choice of school, which was known as
a party school and did not offer the major she wished to study.75 The
father argued that § 513 unfairly ordered divorced or never-married
parents to pay the college expenses of their children, but did not re-
65. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d at 1388.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1390.
68. Id. (citing Maitzen v. Maitzen, 163 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d at 1390.
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quire the same of married parents.76 He further alleged that § 513 im-
permissibly created two classes of children—those whose parents are
unmarried and those whose parents are married.77 Furthermore, he
argued that as an unmarried parent he was denied the right to make
parental decisions related to his child’s education, because the statute
does not allow any parental input as to where the child attends college
before ordering the parent to pay for said expenses.78 The father
pointed out that married parents enjoy this right and are not ordered
to pay their children’s expenses when they disagree with their child’s
choice of school.79
Despite the previous ruling in Kujawinski, which addressed similar
grievances, the father in Yakich argued that in light of the “changed
demographics, societal attitudes and developments in case law in both
state and federal courts,” the rational basis for the Illinois Supreme
Court’s ruling in Kujawinski no longer existed.80 He noted that in
2018, two-parent, married families made up less than half of all fami-
lies, and children of unmarried parents are considered “normal” based
on today’s demographics.81 The father cited several studies supporting
this position, including the facts that the divorce rate as of 2011 in
Illinois was forty-six percent, unmarried women accounted for forty
percent of the birth rate in the United States as of 2014, and only
forty-six percent of children under the age of eighteen live in a two-
parent, married home.82 These statistics, the father contended, sup-
ported the argument that the state interest of mitigating the alleged
harms of divorce no longer exists, as divorce is no longer unusual or
necessarily a disadvantage.83 In fact, divorce is now “the norm”
among families in Illinois and America.84
The DuPage County Court agreed with the father in Yakich.85 The
court held that society has greatly changed since 1978, and therefore
the rational basis cited in Kujawinski is no longer achievable.86 Fur-
thermore, there is no other rational basis, other than that cited in
Kujawinski, that justifies the statute.87 Because a rational basis no
76. Id.
77. Id.
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longer exists, the court concluded that the father in Yakich was denied
his constitutional right to equal protection.88
The Yakich case is currently pending appeal before the Illinois Su-
preme Court, which will finally settle the issue of whether § 513 is
unconstitutional on the basis of equal protection.89 While opponents
may feel that the statute is unfair to unmarried parents and unlawfully
discriminates against them, challengers to the statute may have a hard
time overcoming rational basis review in the state’s highest court. The
argument that the court should find that the statute is not rationally
related to any legitimate state interest is a difficult one to make and is
unlikely to succeed.
II. ANALYSIS
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion,90 all laws must treat similarly situated persons in the same man-
ner.91 Here, it is clear that the statute in question, IMDMA’s
provision regarding post-majority educational expenses, treats simi-
larly situated persons differently.92 The statute requires some unmar-
ried parents to pay for college, while it does not require the same from
married parents.93 Although on its face this statute seems unfair to
divorced parents, this alone does not make it unconstitutional per se.
This Part will address the likelihood of success of a constitutional
claim against § 513 in today’s society. Further, this Part will discuss
the implications of the statute on the lives of parents in various situa-
tions, and how the statute often has unfair consequences for both par-
ents and children. Finally, this Part will illustrate how the statute may
be underinclusive in alleviating the harms it claims to mitigate.
A. Unconstitutional Discrimination Against Parents
The primary argument by opponents of § 513 of the IMDMA is that
the statute unreasonably creates two classes of persons—married par-
ents and unmarried parents.94 Parents ordered to pay child support for
their post-majority aged child have argued that the statute unconstitu-
tionally discriminates against unmarried parents by ordering them to
88. Id.
89. Yakich v. Aulds, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit DuPage Cty., No. 15-F-651(Ill. Cir. Ct. May 4,
2018), appeal docketed, No. 123667 (Ill. May 31, 2018).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
91. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966).
92. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513 (West 2019).
93. Id.
94. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 11  5-FEB-20 12:16
2019] COURT-ORDERED COLLEGE 181
pay for their post-majority aged child’s college education; whereas
married parents with children over the age of eighteen may not be
required to pay for their children’s education.95
1. Standard of Review
To determine the constitutionality of § 513, the court will first have
to determine what standard of review should be used to evaluate the
statute. Rational basis review will be used by the court unless the dis-
crimination is against a suspect class or infringes upon a fundamental
right.96 The classification of parents here—married versus unmar-
ried—is not recognized as a suspect class that triggers heightened
scrutiny.97 Therefore, the only other situation that would require a
heightened form of scrutiny is if the statute infringes upon a funda-
mental right of unmarried parents.98
Fundamental rights include both those enumerated in the Constitu-
tion and those recognized by the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has
established the principle that individuals have a constitutionally pro-
tected right to control the upbringing of their children.99 Within this
fundamental right is the principle that, absent abuse and neglect, the
courts and legislatures typically may not intrude into a family and
make parenting decisions.100 Statutes that infringe upon this right may
be subject to a heightened form of scrutiny.101
Upon commencement of a dissolution action, however, the state be-
comes involved in the parties’ parental decision-making and becomes
a “third party” to the action.102 Yet, this does not necessarily mean
that a parent’s right to make decisions for their child is always weak-
95. See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Ill. 1978); see also Curtis v. Kline,
666 A.2d 265, 268 (Pa. 1995).
96. People v. Masterson, 958 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ill. 2011).
97. The court will evaluate a constitutional claim under strict scrutiny if the statute discrimi-
nates against a suspect class. Traditionally, classifications of race, national origin and illegitimacy
are recognized as suspect classes and trigger strict scrutiny in equal protection claims. Addition-
ally, discrimination based on sex or gender triggers intermediate scrutiny. See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
98. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
99. In re D.W., 827 N.E.2d 466, 481 (Ill. 2005).
100. Id. See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923) (finding that parents have
liberty to allow their children to be taught foreign languages in schools if they so choose); Pierce
v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533–34 (1925) (finding that parents have a fundamental right to
choose how and where to educate their child); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (finding
constitutional right to decide to have a child).
101. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
102. In re Marriage of Duffy, 718 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
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ened upon divorce.103 The court will give great deference to the par-
ent’s decisions, provided that they are able to come to an agreement
regarding the child-related issues.104 Thus, even parents going through
divorce proceedings are presumed to have parental autonomy and to
act in the best interests of their child.105 However, unlike an intact
family, when parents cannot come to an agreement that is in the best
interests of the child the court will step in and become the default
decision maker for the child-related issues.106 Thus, the right to paren-
tal autonomy is not absolute.107 In such circumstances, the court is
able to make decisions for the parents regarding parenting time, deci-
sion making, and support.108 Similarly, courts gain the ability to order
parents to contribute to educational expenses, including expenses for
college. As the Indiana Supreme Court stated, “expenses of college
are not unlike those of orthodontia, music lessons, summer camp, and
various other optional undertakings within the discretion of married
parents but subject to compulsory payment . . .” for parents who are
not together.109  Therefore, imposing a financial obligation upon un-
married parents to contribute to college expenses for their children
likely does not interfere with a parent’s fundamental right to raise his
or her children.
Because § 513 of the IMDMA does not discriminate against a sus-
pect class or infringe on a fundamental right, the court should use ra-
tional basis review to determine the constitutionality of the statute.110
Under this standard, the statute must be rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest.111 Therefore, the question turns on whether a stat-
ute requiring divorced parents to fund their child’s college education
is rationally related to a legitimate interest of the state of Illinois.
2. Does a Legitimate State Interest Exist?
The alleged legitimate state interest which justifies § 513 is the
state’s goal of mitigating the economic and personal impact that di-
vorce has on children.112 One main argument against this state interest
is that, since divorce and unmarried families are much more common
103. In re Marriage of Coulter, 976 N.E.2d 337, 342 (Ill. 2012).
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000)).
106. Fawzey v. Fawzey, 973 A.2d 347, 360 (N.J. 2009).
107. Lehman v. Stephens, 499 N.E.2d 103, 109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
108. Fawzey, 973 A.2d at 360.
109. Neudecker v. Neudecker, 577 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Ind. 1991).
110. People v. Masterson, 958 N.E.2d 686, 691 (Ill. 2011).
111. Id.
112. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1389 (Ill. 1978).
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now than they were when Kujawinski was decided in 1978, there is no
longer a disparate impact and therefore there is no legitimate state
interest.113
It is true that in today’s society, divorce affects a substantial number
of families. Based on statistics that show that fifty percent of mar-
riages end in divorce, it is indisputable that divorce is a common oc-
currence in America.114 After the introduction of no-fault divorce in
1969, the 1970’s saw exponential growth in the number of divorces
nation-wide.115 However, after reaching a record high in 1981, the di-
vorce rate began to fluctuate and eventually decline.116 Therefore,
while true that divorce is common in today’s society, the argument
that divorce today is drastically more prevalent than it was in 1978 is
not necessarily grounded.117 Nonetheless, divorce is not the only
source of changing family demographics in America. Since 1979, the
rate of children born to non-married families has drastically risen,
while accompanied by a decrease in marriages overall.118 In 2017, one-
in-four parents who were living with a child were unmarried.119 Addi-
tionally, the number of children living with an unmarried parent has
almost tripled since 1968, totaling roughly 24 million children.120
Therefore, despite a leveling-off of divorce rates, non-intact families
are indeed very common in today’s society.
Critics of § 513 argue that because divorce and birth outside of mar-
riage is so common, the state interest of mitigating the harm to these
113. See Yakich v. Aulds, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit DuPage Cty., No. 15-F-651 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
May 4, 2018).
114. Kim Parker & Renee Stepler, As US Marriage Rate Hovers at 50%, Education Gap in
Marital Status Widens, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2017/09/14/as-u-s-marriage-rate-hovers-at-50-education-gap-in-marital-status-widens/.
115. W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Fall 2009, https://
www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-evolution-of-divorce.
116. National Center for Health Statistics, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1987, 38
MONTHLY VITAL STATS. REP., May 1990, at 1, 7, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/mvsr/supp/
mv38_12s2.pdf.
117. In 1978 the divorce “rate was 5.2 per 1,000” United States citizens, whereas the rate in
2017 was 2.9 per 1,000 citizens. Compare National Center for Health Statistics, Advance Report
Final Divorce Statistics, 1978, 29 MONTHLY VITAL STATS. REP., July 1980, at 1, 1, with National
Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/national-marriage-
divorce-rates-00-17.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2019), and National Marriage and Divorce Rate
Trends, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/national_marriage_divorce_rates_00-16.pdf
(last visited Oct. 31, 2019).




120. The number of children living with an unmarried parent has increased from thirteen
percent in 1968 to thirty-two percent in 2017. Id.
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children has diminished accordingly.121 These opponents assert that if
such a high number of families are broken—making non-intact fami-
lies the norm—there is no rational state interest in giving extra assis-
tance to the majority.122 However, the commonality of separated
families does not mean that these children do not still face challenges
that children in married families do not endure, and mitigating these
challenges certainly may be a state interest.
Children of divorce are twice as likely to drop out of high school
than children from intact families.123 Additionally, these children are
more likely to have lower educational aspirations, lower test scores,
and are more likely to be held back a grade and have a lower grade
point average than those from intact families.124 Further, children with
divorced parents are likely to score lower on average on “measures of
achievement, adjustment and well-being,” and are more likely to act
out.125 Studies have found that children with unmarried parents have
lower math and reading skills and lower standardized test skills on
average.126 These children are more likely to drop out of secondary
school than those raised in intact family and according to one study,
only 67.2% of children from single-parent homes and 65.4% from
stepfamilies will graduate high school—compared to the 85% of ado-
lescents from intact families.127
These disparities in academic achievement may be causally related
to the lack of parental involvement that often occurs in divorced fami-
lies.128 Parents in intact families participate more in school, discuss
school more often with their children, and engage with other parents
from school more than those from single parent or stepparent fami-
lies.129 Even when a parent remarries, the study showed that steppar-
121. Yakich v. Aulds, Eighteenth Judicial Circuit DuPage Cty., No. 15-F-651 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May
4, 2018).
122. “In fact, if considered in statistical terms, children from either non-married or divorced
parents would be considered ‘normal’ based on today’s demographics.” Id.
123. Barry D. Ham, The Effects of Divorce on the Academic Achievement of High School
Seniors, 3 JOURNAL OF DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 167, 169 (2003).
124. Effects of Divorce on Children’s Education, MARRIPEDIA (last visited Dec. 18, 2018)
http://marripedia.org/effects_of_divorce_on_children_s_education#fn__7 [hereinafter Children’s
Education, MARRIPEDIA].
125. Brittany Odenweller, Does Parental Divorce Have an Affect on a Child’s Education?,
BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIV. VIRTUAL COMMONS (2014), at 5, https://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1056&context=honors_
proj.
126. Children’s Education, MARRIPEDIA, supra note 124.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. PATRICK F. FAGAN, LEONIE TEN HAVE & WENDY CHEN, MARRIAGE & RELIGION RES.
INST., MARRIAGE, FAMILY STRUCTURE, AND CHILDREN’S EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 2 (2011),
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ents are not as involved in their stepchild’s homework than a father in
an intact family.130
Further, children from non-intact families face economic hardships
that they may not have endured had their parents stayed married.
Nearly half of families experience poverty after a divorce.131 Accord-
ing to one study, the household income of a child’s family following
divorce dropped about forty-two percent on average.132 This, in turn,
affect’s the child’s economic welfare.133 After a divorce, children are
more likely to experience poverty and diminished economic circum-
stances as a result of their parents decreased net worth.134 Later in
life, children of divorce are more likely to experience the same finan-
cial problems as their parents, and their economic mobility is lower
than those raised in intact families.135
As a result of both the academic and financial impacts on children
of divorce, it is no surprise that these children are consequently less
likely to attend college than their counterparts from married fami-
lies.136 Over 57% of children from intact families enroll in college,
whereas only 32.5% of children in stepfamilies, 47.5% of children in
single-parent families, and 31.8% of children living in families with
neither parent present will enter college.137 Even when those students
apply and are admitted, children from broken homes are less likely to
receive support past the age of majority in order to attend college.138
Based on the foregoing statistics that demonstrate the negative
effects of coming from a non-intact family, it is clear that children
raised in such families are likely to face both educational and social
http://marri.us/wp-content/uploads/Marriage-Family-Structure-and-Childrens-Educational-
Attainment.pdf.
130. Children’s Education, MARRIPEDIA, supra note 124.
131. Effect of Divorce on Financial Stability, MARRIPEDIA, http://marripedia.org/effects.of.di-
vorce.on.financial.stability (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Financial Stability,
MARRIPEDIA].
132. Id.
133. A Canadian study shows that 61% of children’s households become “per capital” low-
income households after parents separate, compared with 13.1% when the parents are married.
Id.
134. Id.
135. W. Bradford Wilcox et al., Strong Families, Prosperous States: Do Healthy Families Affect
the Wealth of Nations?, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (2015), https://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/IFS-HomeEconReport-2015-FinalWeb.pdf. Economic mobility is de-
fined as “the ability of an individual or family to improve their income, and social status, in an
individual lifetime or between generations.” Economic Mobility, YOUR DICTIONARY, https://
www.yourdictionary.com/economic-mobility (last updated Sept. 22, 2019).
136. Ham, supra note 123, at 169.
137. Gary D. Sandefur et al., The Effects of Parental Marital Status during Adolescence on
High School Graduation, 71 SOCIAL FORCES 103, 111 (1992).
138. Cohen, supra note 33, at 202.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 16  5-FEB-20 12:16
186 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:171
issues. Just because unconventional family structures are more com-
mon in our society today does not mean that the adverse effects on
these children no longer exist. Therefore, there is still an ongoing le-
gitimate state interest to mitigate these negative effects.
However, the inquiry does not end with the existence of a legiti-
mate state interest. The challenged statute in question must also be
rationally related to the legitimate interest in order to be deemed con-
stitutional.139 Therefore, the court must further analyze whether a
statute that may require divorced parents to contribute to their child’s
college education is rationally related to mitigating the negative ef-
fects on a child after the divorce.
3. Rational Relationship
Under rational basis review, the standard for a finding of constitu-
tionality is very low. The court will presume that the law is constitu-
tional, and if there is any rational basis for a legitimate state purpose,
the law will pass constitutional scrutiny.140 The court need not con-
sider all justifications for a statute, as long as some rational basis ex-
isted for the statute when enacted.141
Here, there seems to be justification for the statute under rational
basis review and the constitutional challenge will likely fail. The statis-
tics show that children from non-intact families face both academic
and economic disadvantages and are less likely to attend college.142
Thus, the state has a legitimate interest in remedying as many of these
disadvantages as possible. Section 513 attempts to mitigate these is-
sues by helping those children who would have been able to go to
college had their parents stayed married. The statute does not require
all unmarried parents to pay for their child’s college but encourages
higher education if the child would have pursued it had their parents
been married. In other words, the statute requires financially-able par-
ents to contribute to their child’s education, assuming that the child
has the grades and ability to attend college. Because children of di-
vorce are less likely to receive funding and parental support for higher
education, § 513 is related to the state’s interest of alleviating one of
the negative impacts of divorce. Therefore, the statute is rationally
related to the legitimate purpose of mitigating adverse impacts of di-




142. Ham, supra note 123, at 169.
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B. Section 513’s Current Effects
In the event that § 513 is upheld as constitutional, the statute is still
unfair to many of the parents that it affects. While in theory, the stat-
ute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest and therefore
makes it lawful, the application in real world scenarios can demon-
strate how the statute often has an unequal and unfair application for
married parents versus unmarried parents.
1. Constitutional Does Not Mean Fair
Consider how a child’s choice of school may have different conse-
quences in an intact family versus an unmarried family. In an intact
family, where both parents are presumed to be responsible for con-
tributing to the college expenses of their child, either or both parents
are able to refuse to pay for the education if they disagree with the
choice of school that the child wants to attend. Although the child is
an adult, and is legally allowed to choose a college without parental
input, the parents of an intact family may make an offer to contribute
to college contingent upon the child’s choice of school. For example,
the parents may require the child to go to a cheaper school, or a
school with better educational credentials, in order to receive help
with funding. It often happens that both the child and the parents of
an intact family are involved in the college decision-making process
and come to an agreement without the interference of the court. How-
ever, if there is not an agreement, the parents are not legally obligated
to pay for their child’s college and the child is not legally obligated to
make the decision with the input of their parents. In such a situation,
the parents may simply refuse to pay for the child’s college education,
and the child can either oblige with their wishes or find funding of
another source.
In a divorced family, however, this is not the case. Unlike intact
families, divorced parents do not have the same leverage with their
children when it comes to making the decision as to where to attend
past the age of majority. The child may choose any school she so
pleases regardless of price, academic credentials, fields of study of-
fered, or other factors as may be preferred by either parent. If one
parent were to oppose the child’s college of choice, that parent may be
legally ordered to contribute a large amount to the child’s expenses
without having any input in the child’s decision. This would be the
case as long as the other parent, in agreement with the child, files a
petition in court pursuant to § 513. As long as the court considers the
factors required by § 513, the parent has no ability to contest or bar-
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gain with the child’s decision and is legally obligated to provide sup-
port for his or her adult child’s expenses.
This is precisely the issue in the pending Yakich case.143 The father
is willing to contribute to his child’s expenses, but is unwilling to con-
tribute to the current school she attends.144 Regardless, the court or-
dered the father to pay for the child’s expenses, leaving him no choice
in the matter.145 Although the statute currently calls for “all relevant
factors” to be considered in determining college expenses, the court
currently has the discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether or not choice of school qualifies as a “relevant factor” in
awarding support.146 Even when one parent has a legitimate objection
to the choice of school, as in Yakich, there is no recourse for the par-
ent if the court decides against him or her. This completely under-
mines a parent’s ability to give leveraged input regarding where their
money and child is going, which they would have been able to do had
they stayed married.
The statute can also have unfair effects on the children of a parent’s
new marriage. In such a situation, a parent still has a child support
obligation to his children from a previous marriage regardless of his
decision to remarry and have new children. In cases when this obliga-
tion is extended to forced payments of post-majority child support, it
may affect the quality of life and the ability to pay for the expenses of
the parent’s other children.
This scenario can be seen in In re Marriage of Newton, a 2017 Illi-
nois case.147 In the case, the child wanted to attend the University of
Illinois; which is the most expensive public university in Illinois, priced
at approximately $33,000 to $34,000 per year.148 The father, while
making a relatively decent salary, had remarried and testified that
contributing to the child’s tuition and expenses at the University of
Illinois would place a large financial burden on him.149 The father
agreed to help contribute to expenses for a community college, where
the child would automatically transfer to the University of Illinois





147. In re Marriage of Newton, 2017 WL 3484950 1, 2 (2017).
148. Id. at 1.
149. The father, Kenneth, made around $94,714 in 2016. Id. at 2. However, Kenneth and his
new wife were in thousands of dollars of medical debt because of his other daughter’s congenital
kidney disease. Id. Kenneth testified he would have to take out loans, would not be able to retire
at a normal age, and may not be able to send his other child to college if forced to pay for the
University of Illinois. Id.
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upon completion.150 The father believed that this was the more finan-
cially sensible option for all parties involved, and would prevent not
only himself, but his daughter from going into debt.151 The court held
that the student’s impressive educational performance and hard work
ultimately outweighed the father’s arguments.152 The father was or-
dered to pay for one-third of the cost to attend the University of
Illinois.153
Newton is another example of the unfairness that can stem from
§ 513. The father was ordered to take on another obligation that
would place a greater financial hardship on him and his other chil-
dren.154 This was despite his disagreement with the choice of school
and that he no longer had to pay child support for his first child.155
Furthermore, even though the statute required the court to consider
the father’s present and future financial ability, including his savings
for retirement, the court still ordered him to pay one-third of the ex-
penses despite the fact that his future finances and his ability to retire
were diminished.156
Additionally, the adverse effect that § 513 may have on a parent’s
remarriage and subsequent children may even go further than the ex-
ample in Newton. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that
a parent’s new spouse’s income may be considered when determining
the “financial resources” of that party pursuant to § 513.157 Typically,
a new spouse’s financial ability is not considered in child support pay-
ments and they have no legal obligation to support his or her stepchil-
dren.158 However, because § 513 requires consideration of “financial
resources” and not “income” of each parent, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that a new spouse’s income is fair game in a determination of
post-majority educational awards.159 Under this reasoning, a parent’s
new spouse may be ordered to contribute college expenses to a
stepchild. This creates direct financial pitfalls for a parent’s new
spouse and children, which may affect their lifestyle and financial
abilities.
150. Newton, 2017 WL 3484950 at 2.
151. Id.




156. Newton, 2017 WL 3484950 at 3.
157. In re Marriage of Drysch, 732 N.E.2d 125, 130 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 646.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 20  5-FEB-20 12:16
190 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:171
Finally, the statute can create yet another unfair legal disadvantage
to children who live in intact families. Under § 513, children from in-
tact families whose parents refuse to pay for their college education,
despite having the available funds and means to do so, have no legal
recourse under the law. However, children whose parents are di-
vorced and refuse to pay but have the financial means, are able to
recover the funds and attend college.160 As the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted in Curtis v. Kline, this could result in a discrepancy even
within the same family.161 For example, a divorced parent may have
one child of a previous relationship that does not reside with him and
one from a current marriage that resides in his home.162 The father
may have the financial means to pay full tuition for both of the chil-
dren’s colleges, but he refuses to do so. Pursuant to § 513, the child of
his previous marriage can obtain a court order that requires the parent
to pay for their college education.163 However, the child that currently
lives with the parent has no legal recourse and is unable to attend
college. This is a unique example of how the statute can possibly cre-
ate vast disparages between two classes of children.
The above examples demonstrate that although the rationale be-
hind the statute may have pure intentions, the practical application
may lead to unjust results.
2. Does § 513 Achieve its Purpose?
One alleged purpose of § 513 is to mitigate the adverse impacts that
divorce has on a child.164 The statistics show that these impacts are
extensive.165 However, while the provision claims to encourage higher
education for children from non-intact families, the statute is underin-
clusive in achieving that goal. While children face educational barriers
after a divorce that may prevent them from reaching higher education,
these barriers often occur long before the decision to go to college is
even considered. A child’s parents could divorce at any stage of the
child’s life, and it is at this time when the child might begin to suffer
160. Under the 2016 amendments to § 513, children do not legally have standing to file a
petition to recover educational expenses and cannot technically bring a claim. In order to re-
cover these financial resources, the former spouse or parent seeking contribution must file the
petition on behalf of the child. However, in the event of the death or legal disability of the
parent who would have had standing, the child is able to file a petition on his own behalf. Yazici
et al., supra note 1, at 424.
161. Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. 1995).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1389 (Ill. 1978).
165. See Ham, supra note 123; Children’s Education, MARRIPEDIA, supra note 124.
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from the aforementioned educational and economic disadvantages.
When these disadvantages start at a young age, the child’s grades
might suffer. This could result in the child being less likely to apply
and be accepted to college when they are older, even if they have a
source of funding. Therefore, the statute, which alleges to mitigate the
educational harms of divorce, does not come into play until a child’s
educational career is almost over, which may be too late. As a result,
the statute’s protections can sometimes be rendered useless as these
children complete their school requirements and receive their degrees.
An order to require parents to contribute to college expenses is use-
less if the child cannot get accepted to college.
Further, the statute purports to mitigate the economic harm on chil-
dren of divorce. Because children from non-intact families are more
likely to experience poverty,166 the statute attempts to rectify this
harm by ordering their divorced or unmarried parent to contribute to
these college expenses. This means that two parents, who are less
likely to be financially stable than if they were married, are ordered to
pay a significant cost for their children to attend college. This results
in further economic obligations for the parents. If there are other sib-
lings in the family, they could face financial disadvantages as well.
This could further decrease the parents’ ability to provide for the mi-
nor children. Placing a larger financial burden on parents, in order to
mitigate a financial burden on the child, seems to be counterintuitive.
III. IMPACT
This part recommends reform to the statute and assesses what im-
pact those changes would have on families in the future.
A. Proposed Reform of § 513
Absent a finding of unconstitutionality, the legislature should be
called to reform § 513. The statute in its current form orders the court
to consider “all relevant factors,” including the four main factors listed
in § 513(b).167 For an issue that can drastically change the financial
welfare of the parents affected, there should be more rigid require-
ments or limitations on how a court comes to a conclusion. Several
other states have adopted statutes that seem to encourage a fairer
result.
166. See Financial Stability, MARRIPEDIA, supra note 131.
167. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(b) (West 2019).
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In Maryland and Montana, for example, child support terminates
when the child reaches the age of eighteen.168 No statute or case law
allows a court to order an unwilling parent to contribute to any ex-
penses for the child once they have been emancipated.169 However,
parents may contractually obligate themselves to pay child support
past the age of majority by incorporating an agreement into the judg-
ment for divorce. If college is an expectation at the time of divorce,
the parties can agree that they both will contribute when the time
comes. If college is not something that the parents wish to provide for
their child, it need not be included in the judgment. Although there is
no certainty as to the parents’ future financial abilities, the parents
may still be able to create an agreement to contribute to the child’s
college expenses relative to their financial means. The issue of college
expenses becomes another negotiation that the parties will work
through during their divorce. This allows divorced parents to be
treated as similarly as possible to married parents. Married parents
have no legal obligation to support their children past the age of eigh-
teen, unless they agree to do so. Therefore, a statute that only allows a
court to order college expenses on a parent, if he has previously
agreed to do so, affords divorced parents the same autonomy and de-
cision-making power that married parents have. If the parent later ref-
uses, the prior agreement will bind the parent unless a substantial
change of circumstances has occurred between the time of the agree-
ment and the time of the refusal. This is a viable option that Illinois
should consider adopting.
Alternatively, the legislature should adopt more mandatory factors
that the court must consider before awarding child support. As with
many family law determinations, the decision on educational expenses
is highly discretionary. As a result, many sections of the IMDMA set
out several express “relevant factors” for the court to consider. This is
in addition to any factors that the court might also deem relevant. For
example, the property division section enumerates twelve comprehen-
sive factors,170 the maintenance section lists fourteen factors,171 and
the determination of parental decision-making specifies fifteen fac-
tors.172 The benefit of including so many factors in the language of the
statute is to ensure that the court is considering each and every possi-
168. Madeline Marzano-Lesnevich & Scott Adam Laterra, Child Support and College: What is
the Correct Result?, 22 J. AMER. ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS 335, 354, 360 (2009).
169. Id. at 354.
170. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/503(d) (West 2019).
171. Id. 5/504(a).
172. Id. 6/602.7(b).
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bly relevant factor before making a decision that largely impacts a
family.
Section 513, however, enumerates only four factors.173 Though it
states that “the court shall consider all relevant factors that appear
reasonable and necessary,” only the four factors listed are a require-
ment for the court to consider.174 After considering these four factors,
the court has the ability to award tuition, housing, books, and medical
and living expenses to one or both parents.175 Though these expenses
are capped at the amount of the cost at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign,176 these costs in total can add up to hundreds of
thousands of dollars. Because of the high financial stakes that may
result, the statute should include more than four factors to ensure that
every possibility is explored before placing such an expensive burden
on a parent.
Washington’s statute for post-majority support demonstrates how
consideration of more factors can be beneficial. In Washington, the
court must first determine “whether the child is in fact dependent and
is relying upon the parents for the reasonable necessities of life.”177 If
the court finds that the child is still in fact dependent, the court then
lists the following nonexclusive factors:
Age of the child; the child’s needs; the expectations of the parties
for their children when the parents were together; the child’s pros-
pects, desires, aptitudes, abilities or disabilities; the nature of the
postsecondary education sought; the parents’ level of education,
standard of living, current and future resources[; and] . . . the
amount and type of support that the child would have been afforded
if the parents had stayed together.178
In practice, this may result in a fairer ruling for parents. Before even
considering the statutory factors, the court must first determine that
the child is still financially dependent upon the parents and that sup-
port is absolutely necessary. After this initial finding, the extensive
range of factors listed in the statute ensures that the court will con-
sider every aspect of the family’s situation before making a determina-
tion. Many of these factors are not currently required under the
Illinois statute, but may be beneficial to achieve a more desirable re-
sult for unmarried parents. Illinois should consider adopting some or




176. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/513(d)(2) (West 2019).
177. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.090(2) (West 1991).
178. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Section 513 of the IMDMA requires certain unmarried parents to
contribute to their child’s college expenses. This statute imposes dif-
ferent requirements on parents based on their marital status. While
many opponents of the statute challenge it as unconstitutional, when
subject to rational basis review the statute will likely pass as rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. However, the fact that the statute
is constitutional does not mean that it is fair in application or that it
actually achieves its intended goals. The statute would better serve
families if parents were allowed to contractually obligate themselves
to how they want to assist their children in paying for school or by
adopting more pertinent factors when deciding how much money each
parent should contribute. As it stands now, the statute has created a
huge financial disparity between intact families and those [that] have
gone through a divorce. For this reason, the legislature should reform
the statute in order to distribute fairness across all families in today’s
society.
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